North Korea between China and Russia.. Will Beijing lose control of Pyongyang? | policy

Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang has passed, but its impact on the region and the world will remain until further notice. This visit placed geographical and cultural rapprochement in a broader context of current circumstances and long-term bilateral relations, and revealed that Korean leader Kim Jong Un is no longer isolated, but rather represents the fulcrum in a fractured global order.

Whether the main motive for the visit was to consolidate the principles of “fraternal socialism” or to restore elements of Chinese influence, North Korea is no longer just an “Asian satellite” of Beijing, but rather has become a solid knot in a Chinese-Russian triangle that the Americans and Japanese are watching from a not-so-distant distance.

With the stability of the security situation with Russian military support, it became logical for Pyongyang to refocus on the economic aspect, which cannot be sustained without China, and to send a clear message to the world about the rapprochement of the two countries, with the pressure this puts on all the major powers concerned with the security of Northeast Asia, especially Washington and Tokyo.

Historical alliance and security interests

In this context, the Chinese People’s Daily presented the visit as a moment “starting from a new historical point” in the path of relations linked by “a deep historical wealth, a solid political foundation, and solid emotional ties” between the two parties and the two countries.

The newspaper pointed out that four constants unite the two countries: driving understanding from the summit level, consolidating political trust, raising the level of practical cooperation, strengthening the ties of friendship between the two peoples, and strengthening strategic coordination out of a commitment to “justice and fairness.”

Although the newspaper focused its report on “mutual benefit” and economic integration, it linked the visit to a broader security context inspired by the two presidents’ talk about managing the region, and the need to defend sovereignty, security, and development interests in Asia, in a clear reference to the continuing American pressure and the rearmament of Japan.

Economy, borders and an ancient alliance

The South China Morning Post newspaper dealt with the visit in a direct, pragmatic manner, based on the fact that Pyongyang cannot do without Chinese economic support, despite its rapid openness to Moscow.

The newspaper quoted Chung Kuo Lee, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyzes, as saying that Beijing possesses sufficient economic influence to keep North Korea within its sphere of influence, especially since China is still North Korea’s main export market, and the source of intermediate goods and stable foreign investment, roles in which Russia cannot replace it.

The South China Morning Post reads that the presence of the Chinese Minister of Commerce among the accompanying delegation indicates the preparation of a broader economic cooperation package, and perhaps a limited replication of elements of the Chinese development model, without this rising to the level of complete openness.

Analysts quoted by the newspaper also pointed out that Beijing is investing in deepening economic and cultural engagement, including tourism, not only to improve Pyongyang’s internal situation, but also to ensure that it remains within the Chinese orbit in the face of Moscow’s attempts to attract it through military cooperation.

The absence of the “denuclearization” file this time from public discourse reflects a shift in priorities in favor of establishing North Korean deterrence within a broader system of Chinese-Russian cooperation.

A necessary alliance and arms race

In a recent report, the South China Morning Post linked the visit to a broader context, in which it recalled the wars waged by the United States in more than one theater, and the aggressive nature of Japan’s rearmament.

Considering that Beijing is the only superpower capable of communicating with countries that stand on opposite sides of international politics, it sees the Sino-Korean rapprochement as a mutual necessity, because the stability of the peninsula is part of China’s national security, and Chinese political cover constitutes an urgent need for Pyongyang in the face of American-Japanese pressure.

The report pointed out that the absence of the “denuclearization” issue this time from public discourse reflects a shift in priorities in favor of establishing North Korean deterrence within a broader system of Chinese-Russian cooperation in confronting Washington and Tokyo.

North Korean maneuver margin

On the Asia Times website – which describes itself as neutral and independent – an article placed Xi’s visit within the framework of what he calls the “guarantor problem.” The author of the article says that it is the first time in decades that China no longer alone has the “leash” of North Korea, after the comprehensive defense agreement with Russia gave it a second military umbrella.

The writer recalled the course of the past years, from sending thousands of North Korean soldiers to support Moscow in Ukraine, to the enormous financial returns compared to the volume of Pyongyang’s foreign trade, all the way to the transfer of drone and air defense technology, and perhaps even technologies related to nuclear submarines.

This may be what prompted Beijing to try to slow North Korea’s transition to Russian dependency, without losing what remains of its economic and political influence there.

On the other hand, Kim continues – according to the article – to transform the old dependence on China into a relatively balanced negotiating relationship, relying on a growing nuclear arsenal, alternative financing networks through cyber piracy, and combat experience acquired by his army in Ukraine.

Fragile stability in East Asia

The US-Japanese move towards strengthening missile and defense capabilities, and intensifying the naval presence in the Western Pacific, increases North Korea’s strategic value to its Chinese and Russian sponsors as an advanced line of contact with US forces.

In this context, Beijing’s silence on the denuclearization issue becomes a dual message to reassure Pyongyang that its arsenal has become a fait accompli within the regional deterrence equation on the one hand, and on the other hand an indirect signal of pressure on Washington and Tokyo that any additional escalation or arms race in the region will collide with a more cohesive tripartite front around the Korean Peninsula.

It appears that the “decisive consensus” that resulted from Xi’s visit to North Korea is nothing but an attempt to regain the initiative in managing a delicate balance between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang, forming a front in the equation of deterrence and escalation in East Asia, and confronting rapid and unprecedented developments in the complex international situation.