The Israeli press did not treat Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s clarifications as a passing detail in a diplomatic debate, but read them as an early indication of the limits of the new Syrian role in the Lebanese file, and the limits of Trump’s ability to redistribute the roles of regional powers with a quick political decision.
After US President Donald Trump threatened to assign the Hezbollah file to Syria, or enable Damascus to deal with the party inside Lebanon, Al-Sharaa’s response came to reset the meaning that Syria does not want a new war, nor a military entry into Lebanon, but it wants an indirect political role that passes through the Lebanese state and its institutions.
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In the Hebrew reading, the story began with Trump’s own statement, not with Shara’s response. Israel Hayom reported, in a follow-up published on June 21, 2026, that Trump expressed his disappointment in Israel’s inability to “topple Hezbollah,” saying that Israel “cannot do anything without bringing down buildings,” and that he was considering encouraging Shara to enter Lebanon and fight the party, based on his assessment that Syria might act “more precisely.”
This statement appeared in the Israeli media to be closer to a revolution in the engineering of the Lebanese file. Trump did not limit himself to criticizing the Israeli performance, but rather proposed what it called a “regional contractor” as an alternative to it. Hence, the Hebrew press saw that the issue was not only related to Hezbollah, but rather to Israel’s position in managing the northern front, and to the extent of Washington’s willingness to try non-Israeli paths in Lebanon.
Al-Sharaa’s response, as reported by Lior Ben-Ari in Yedioth Ahronoth, was to confirm that Trump’s words were “interpreted incorrectly,” as if he meant that Syria “will invade Lebanon tomorrow morning.” According to Yedioth Ahronoth, Al-Sharaa clarified that Syria was interested in searching for a “safe solution,” not opening a new war.
The most important thing in this response, according to the Hebrew media, was that it was not a refusal to resolve the Hezbollah issue, but rather a rejection of the direct military method. Al-Sharaa said, according to Yedioth Ahronoth, that Syria “extends its hand to the Lebanese,” and that it may sit with Hezbollah at the table if that serves the interests of both Syria and Lebanon.
Here, the Hebrew media read Al-Sharaa’s position as an attempt to stand in a middle zone: no protection for Hezbollah, no involvement in an Israeli-American war against it. In other words, Damascus wants to show itself as a party capable of contributing to the solution, not as an executive tool in the hands of Trump or Israel.
Israeli concern
On Channel 12, the most tense Israeli reading appeared. The report reported that Trump’s proposal raises great concern within Israel, and that an Israeli source described the idea of enabling Syria to address the Hezbollah issue as similar to “throwing a match into an explosive barrel,” warning that the result may be the arrival of “Al-Qaeda and Erdogan” to the northern border, as he put it.
This statement reflects the essence of Israeli concern. The problem is not only with Sharia law, but with the forces that could stand behind it, led by Turkey. Therefore, the idea was not read in Tel Aviv as a simple security replacement, but rather as a possibility for the birth of a new Sunni axis in Lebanon and Syria, which may remove Iranian influence but does not necessarily give Israel a safer environment.
In a previous report published on June 16, Lior Ben-Ari and Itamar Eichner presented a reading that quoted informed Israeli sources as saying that the idea of Syria dealing militarily with Hezbollah “seems like a virtual reality,” and that Syria “cannot” work inside Lebanon against the party, and that the most it can do is prevent the smuggling of Iranian weapons through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.
This reading reveals that the Israeli establishment does not see Syria as a stable enough force to engage in a complex Lebanese confrontation. The Syrian regime, according to the Israeli perception, is still preoccupied with consolidating its internal authority and managing sensitive sectarian and regional balances, which makes any adventure in Lebanon a danger to Damascus before it is a danger to Hezbollah.
Guardianship memory
For his part, Shahar Klayman, correspondent for Arab world affairs at Israel Hayom, discussed the historical dimension of the Syrian role in Lebanon, and quoted diplomatic sources that the circumstances of 1976, when Syrian forces entered Lebanon, are radically different from the circumstances of 2026, and that any direct Syrian role today requires understandings between Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, which makes it an unrealistic scenario.
These sources used a striking expression when they said that Al-Sharaa sees Lebanon as a “quagmire” and he does not want to reproduce the experience of the previous Syrian tutelage, nor to enter into a Lebanese arena from which it is difficult to exit. Therefore, his position seems closer to a double message: yes to reducing Hezbollah’s influence, no to the Syrian military return to Lebanon.
Türkiye knot
In i24 News, Eitan Lasry went for a more strategic reading, considering that Trump’s proposal may expose Israel to a new kind of danger. It may lead to replacing the Iran-Hezbollah axis with a new Ottoman Sunni axis led by Turkey, Syria, and Qatar, according to him, an axis that benefits from broad international legitimacy, close relations with Washington, and Turkey’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the writer adds.
Lasry expressed broader fears within the Israeli right that Al-Sharaa, supported by the United States and Turkey, will turn into a regional player that cannot be controlled by Israel.
Thus, Al-Shara’a’s position becomes beneficial to Israel from the point of view of his rejection of military intervention, but it is worrying from another angle, as the new Syria may turn into a partner in engineering Lebanon, not a follower in the Israeli approach.
In conclusion, the Hebrew reading reveals that Sharia closed the door to war, but did not close the door to the Syrian role in Lebanon. Israel does not trust Damascus’s ability to dismantle Hezbollah, but it is betting on its ability to cut off supply lines. As for Trump, he opened a bigger question: Who runs Lebanon after Iran’s decline, Israel, Syria, or Turkey?
