Published On 10/6/2026
The political path to stop the war in Sudan is facing a severe field blockage, prolonging a worsening humanitarian catastrophe that has disrupted regional and international peace initiatives, and left millions in hunger and displacement amid external alliances that are fueling the war.
Sudan is experiencing a tragic reality, as reports indicate that 40% of the population is in severe hunger, in addition to 14 million displaced people and refugees (9.5% of whom are internally displaced), amid warnings from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of targeting infrastructure and destroying the Ardamta Bridge linking the city of El Geneina and areas near the border with Chad.
In this regard, the readings of analysts clash, as the researcher in strategic affairs, Al-Muatasem Abdel Qader Al-Hassan, sees a clear flaw in the United Nations standards due to its reluctance to call things by their names, and not holding the “rebel militia” (the Rapid Support Forces) directly responsible for the siege of El-Fasher, the captivity operations, and the tribal fighting.
Al-Hassan confirmed – during his talk to the program “Beyond the News” – that the government areas are completely stable and that services and education are available, citing the match between Al-Hilal and Al-Merreikh in the local league in the presence of 60,000 spectators.
In turn, writer and political analyst Mustafa Mohamed Ibrahim holds what he called the “Port Sudan Authority” responsible for the suffering and diverting 90% of the relief to the war effort, accusing the army of destroying the Ardamta Bridge to isolate El Geneina.
According to Mustafa, 25 million people in the “rapid support” areas are living normally, while the citizens of the army areas are fleeing from an evil famine that forces them to flee for the cheap living and agriculture there.
As for the expert on African affairs, Martin Plaut, he puts the two parties on the same page, stressing that the army and the Rapid Support are “responsible for the horrific situation and failed to protect civilians after their dispute over power, and the country’s slide into a brutal war.”
The knot of the political track
The Sudanese dialogue collides with the complex of legitimacy and the exclusion of the other, as Al-Muatasem Al-Hassan attributes stubbornness to the attempt to impose failed, weightless entities, stressing that the solution begins with acknowledging the legitimacy of the current government (the Sovereignty Council, the Ministers, and the Army) in an authentic Sudanese dialogue that brings together stakeholders.
On the other hand, Mustafa Ibrahim denies the legitimacy of the army government, adding that the dependence of the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, on “the robes of the Islamists, the National Congress Party, and the Islamic Movement” hinders peace, and that the Rapid Support Forces and their allies continue to advance militarily to rid the people of them.
In the context of foreign interventions, Martin Plaut draws a map of the regional polarization fueling the conflict, as regional countries support the parties to the war in Sudan, considering the roles of Washington and London to be smaller in this equation.
Future scenarios
Future prospects fluctuate under the weight of both parties’ conviction in the ability to achieve complete military decisiveness on the ground.
In this context, African affairs expert Martin Plaut expects the conflict to continue and the suffering to worsen in light of a political blockage, which may push the crisis towards a broader regional confrontation, especially after the end of the Ethiopian elections.
According to Plaut, breaking this cycle requires urgent pressure – which seems unlikely now – from US President Donald Trump to push the countries involved in the war towards withdrawal.
While Al-Hassan expects the collapse of the Rapid Support in Kordofan and Darfur due to chaos and tribal divisions, as happened in Khartoum and the center, and the army and the people getting rid of them, Ibrahim expresses his conviction in the inevitability of the continuation of “the rapid support’s advance to liberate all the regions and manage services in them.”
