Published on 6/25/2026
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy warned against ships sailing outside the routes determined by Tehran in the Strait of Hormuz, considering that any new corridor announced without coordination with it is “unacceptable and entails extreme danger,” in a position that reflects Iranian discomfort with the temporary route that the Sultanate of Oman announced opening in its part of the strait.
Muscat had announced the provision of a temporary, free sea lane in the Strait of Hormuz, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization, with the aim of organizing the movement of ships and ensuring their safe passage without imposing transit fees. The Revolutionary Guard Navy responded by saying that “some parties” announced a new route without informing Tehran, stressing that safe crossing and the only permitted route through the strait is the one determined by Iran.
The Omani move came at a time when Iran confirmed that the state of the Strait after the war would not return to what it was before, and that it would collect fees in exchange for providing services to ships crossing the Strait. However, Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi said on Thursday that the route provided by his country would be free, while his American counterpart Marco Rubio said, during a meeting with his Gulf counterparts in the Bahraini capital, Manama, that the United States would not accept imposing any fees on crossing the strait, regardless of its name.
Better choice for ships
Military expert Colonel Nidal Abu Zeid believes that the temporary route announced by the Sultanate of Oman may become a first option for ship movement, because it is free and does not exceed 82 kilometers in length, while the Iranian route is about 160 kilometers long.
Abu Zeid said – in an analysis for Al Jazeera – that some Western warships, with the support of American forces, may be responsible for securing navigation in this part of the strait, considering that this path will be far from the capabilities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
Indeed, the southern route designated by the Sultanate of Oman and the international route witnessed a significant increase in traffic today, Thursday, according to what Abdul Qadir Arada presented in an interactive screen on the island.
Arada also pointed out the decline in the value of insurance on oil tankers by 50%, amid the increasing movement in the strait, which reached 258 ships during the past ten days, including 45 oil tankers carrying 49 million barrels.
According to Abu Zaid, this shift in Hormuz represents a major pressure card on Iran, which he said will “lose many of its power cards during the negotiations with the United States,” which may push it, according to his estimation, to try to disrupt the Omani path.
Abu Zeid added that transit movement in the strait takes place through an Iranian route, an Omani route, and a third international route, noting that the Sultanate of Oman has confirmed that coordination for transit on its route will take place with the International Maritime Organization and through International Channel No. 16, which is an “international intelligence channel,” as he described it.
The Revolutionary Guard was angry
The Omani move was not accepted by the Revolutionary Guards, as its naval force published a statement in which it said that “some parties” announced a new route without informing Tehran, stressing that safe crossing in the Strait of Hormuz only takes place via routes determined by Iran.
The Revolutionary Guard stressed that coordination with it is mandatory for ships to cross the strait, warning that it will take measures against violating ships.
The Oman News Agency said that the decision, which was taken on Tuesday, was based on the Sultanate’s firm commitment to the principles of international law and the law of the sea, ensuring freedom of navigation in the strait without imposing transit fees, and in accordance with the results of the efforts and endeavors reached recently by the United States and Iran.
Iranian vision
On the other hand, international affairs researcher Ashkan Membini believes that Iran’s objection to the new route in the Strait of Hormuz “is not limited to a specific maritime route,” but rather is linked to Tehran’s rejection of any security or navigation arrangements formulated in this vital corridor without taking into account its role and location.
Membini told Al Jazeera Net that the Strait of Hormuz represents part of Iran’s “security and strategic environment,” and that any stable mechanism for managing transit in this region must have direct participation from the Islamic Republic.
He added that the issue has two dimensions: security and sovereignty. From a security standpoint, Mmbini says that the experience of the past decades has shown that the presence of powers from outside the region, especially the United States, “did not bring sustainable security to the region,” but rather was a source of tension. As for sovereignty, he believes that Iran, as one of the most prominent coastal actors in the Strait, is sensitive to any arrangements that ignore its “natural and legitimate” role.
Regarding the Revolutionary Guard’s statement that the safe path is determined by Iran, Membini explained that this position focuses – in its reading – on “Iran’s responsibility to secure navigation and manage maritime transit traffic effectively,” stressing that the goal, from Tehran’s point of view, is not to restrict the movement of ships, but rather to raise the level of security of shipping lines and reduce risks in one of the most important energy corridors in the world.
But he acknowledged that Hormuz is viewed in Tehran not only as a trade corridor, but also as an element of geopolitical power and regional deterrence. He said that any long-term arrangements in this strait without Iran’s participation could weaken one of its most important deterrence tools, especially in the post-war period.
Omani position
As for the Omani academic and writer Muhammad bin Awad Al-Mushaykhi, he believes that the Sultanate of Oman’s announcement of the temporary route in the Strait of Hormuz “will have no significant repercussions,” considering that the move took place in coordination with Iran, although not necessarily through the Revolutionary Guards.
Al-Mashikhi told Al-Jazeera Net that the Sultanate of Oman, by virtue of its proximity and sharing the strait with Iran, is always keen to coordinate with Tehran through its official institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency of the Republic, but at the same time he stressed that “Oman has the decision-making and the first word in its territorial waters, and Iran cannot interfere in that.”
He added that what was issued by the Revolutionary Guard should not be treated as the position of all of Iran, saying that “the Revolutionary Guard is not all of Iran,” and that the official Iranian institutions are the ones that deal with the world and manage negotiations with the United States and others.
Al-Mushaikhi considered that Tehran used the Strait of Hormuz card during the war and negotiations, but at the same time it realizes the limits of Omani sovereignty. He said that Oman “stood with Iran in the most difficult circumstances” during the war, but after its end it has the right to take the measures it deems appropriate within its territorial waters and in cooperation with international organizations.
He explained that the Sultanate was patient during the war, because it did not want to bear alone the responsibility for managing the Strait or to become the “policeman of the Strait,” but he added that the end of the war opens the way for Muscat to take navigational measures that regulate traffic in its part of the Strait.
Sovereignty or a negotiating card?
The differing positions reveal that the dispute over the temporary corridor is not only related to a new maritime route, but rather to a broader question about post-war management of the Strait of Hormuz. While Oman sees the step as a sovereign and technical measure within its territorial waters that guarantees freedom of navigation and reduces the cost of transit, Tehran views any route that does not pass through direct coordination with it as a violation of its role in one of the most important energy corridors in the world.
Between the two readings, the Strait of Hormuz appears to be facing a new equation: Will it remain a security and negotiating pressure card in Iran’s hands, or will it gradually turn into a corridor regulated by regional and international arrangements that reduce Tehran’s ability to control transit routes and the cost of passage?
