Published on 6/17/2026
An American academic believes that the war launched by the United States against Iran represents a more severe strategic defeat than the Vietnam War, because it directly harmed basic American interests and weakened Washington’s global standing, while the loss of Vietnam did not prevent the United States from later winning the Cold War.
In an article in Foreign Policy magazine, Paul Musgrave, associate professor of political science at Georgetown University in Qatar, says that US President Donald Trump fought a “war of choice” that he decided on his own, ending in a political and military catastrophe that will leave long-term effects inside and outside the United States.
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Musgrave points out that the war on Iran is apparently different from previous American military defeats. The country did not witness widespread military mobilization or popular protests like those that accompanied the Vietnam War, and the number of American deaths remained limited compared to the massive human losses that occurred in Southeast Asia.
But the writer believes that the small number of American casualties hides the true scale of the defeat, because the criterion for evaluating it is not related to the number of victims, but rather to the extent of the damage to American strategic targets.
It is noteworthy that the Vietnam War, despite its heavy human and political cost, did not change the course of American power globally, as the United States emerged victorious from the Cold War, while Vietnam itself turned into a relatively close partner to Washington.
Adverse results
As for the Iranian case, the author believes that the results were completely opposite, as the United States emerged weaker from the war compared to what it was before its outbreak.
He points out that the American military performance, despite its technological superiority, revealed the limitations of the American arsenal and its unpreparedness to fight long conflicts against stronger opponents, and the images of destruction and killing of Iranian civilians, including schoolgirls who were killed due to what he described as an error in military databases, have become a symbol of this war.
He adds that Iran’s success in penetrating some American defense systems raises serious questions about the ability of these systems to withstand more organized opponents or in longer-term wars.
According to the writer, one of the most prominent failures of the war was the achievement of a result opposite to what Washington aspired to, as it did not lead to the establishment of a pro-American regime in Tehran, but rather strengthened the influence of the hard-line movement and made the Iranian Revolutionary Guard the most powerful player within the country.
Limits of traditional power
Musgrave also believes that the American and Israeli air strikes showed the limits of conventional military power, stressing that the Iranian nuclear program withstood two rounds of joint attacks, which makes the success of any third campaign unlikely.
He warns that the repercussions of the war have exceeded Iran’s borders and affected the entire international system, as Tehran realized that its ability to threaten navigation in the Strait of Hormuz gives it an influential global economic pressure card.
He describes freedom of navigation as a fundamental American strategic goal for more than two centuries, considering that turning the Strait of Hormuz into a geopolitical pressure tool could cause permanent damage to global trade.
The writer points out that the United States’ withdrawal from the Middle East, similar to its withdrawal from Vietnam, seems to be a difficult choice, because the world economy today is more interconnected, and because the Gulf region has become an essential pillar in global supply chains, not only through oil and gas, but also through helium, fertilizers, and aluminium.
Greater risks
The continuation of the American alliance with Israel, in addition to the development of Iranian missile capabilities and the possibility of the advancement of its nuclear program, portends, according to the author, greater risks during the next decade, the effects of which will extend to Europe and South Asia.
Musgrave concludes that the United States will face these repercussions while it is in a weaker position internally and externally, as allies’ confidence in its capabilities will decline, and American public opinion will hesitate to support any new foreign interventions, while Washington’s opponents will become more willing to challenge its will.
The writer concludes his article by saying that historians will, decades later, wonder why this war was fought, just as they did with the Vietnam War, but the answers, no matter how accurate, will not be enough to justify a war that he sees as one of the greatest strategic failures in modern American history.
