The New York Times: Iran has emerged from the war and is more willing to withstand pressure policy

An analysis published by the New York Times believes that the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran during the past months did not achieve the strategic goals that were announced at its beginning, but rather resulted in a new political and security reality that made Iran more extremist and willing to take risks.

The report indicated that the two main goals of the war were to weaken the Iranian regime or push it toward internal political change, and to eliminate its nuclear capabilities and prevent it from continuing to develop its nuclear program. However, the results were different, as the regime did not fall, but rather rearranged the centers of power within it in a way that strengthened the influence of the military establishment, especially the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, at the expense of the traditional religious elites who represented the backbone of the regime.

At a time when the two parties are approaching a preliminary agreement that may pave the way for broader negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program and the future of regional balances, the analysis believes that Iran has emerged from the war more dependent on the military and security leaders and more convinced of the necessity of preserving the elements of its strategic power.

Instead of abandoning its nuclear project, the new Iranian leadership now views it as a basic guarantee of the country’s security and preventing the recurrence of any large-scale attack in the future.

“More resilient”

This transformation comes at a time when Tehran and Washington are continuing attempts to reach a political understanding that will stop the repercussions of the war, and indicators show that the two sides are close to signing a preliminary memorandum of understanding that opens the door to a 60-day round of negotiations to discuss the most complex issues, most notably the Iranian nuclear program and Tehran’s role in the Strait of Hormuz.

The report confirms that Iran is entering these negotiations from a more confident position after it was able, despite the damage it suffered, to preserve an important part of its military structure, its nuclear facilities, and its technical capabilities, and its security institutions have proven their ability to control internal situations and prevent a political or security collapse.

A number of experts believe – according to the report – that the new Iranian leadership differs from the previous leadership in its way of thinking and crisis management, and seems more willing to take risks and more convinced that withstanding military and economic pressures can achieve political gains for it in the negotiations.

In this context, Tehran believes that the United States is not ready to enter into a new all-out war, and that US President Donald Trump prefers to reach an agreement that reduces tension and restores stability to global energy markets, which gives it a wider room to maneuver and reduces its feeling of the need to make major concessions.

The analysis indicates that Iran’s basic demands have not changed despite the war. It still adheres to its right to enrich uranium. It also refuses to abandon its ballistic missile program and insists on continuing to support its regional allies, led by Hezbollah, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), and the Houthi group.

Tehran also demands the release of billions of dollars of its frozen assets, and wants guarantees that allow it to increase oil exports and mitigate the effects of the sanctions that have caused great damage to its economy, which is suffering from a sharp decline and high rates of inflation and unemployment.

A long period of no war and no peace

In the view of many analysts, the war that was supposed to prevent Iran from getting closer to the nuclear threshold may have actually pushed it toward this option more, because, even if it agreed to temporary restrictions, it would still have the scientific expertise, facilities, and infrastructure necessary to quickly restore its nuclear capabilities.

The report also warns that Iran may use its geographical location and influence in the Strait of Hormuz as a permanent pressure card against the United States and its allies, because any threat to shipping traffic there could be immediately reflected in energy prices and international markets.

The war did not end the Iranian challenge – according to the report – but rather reshaped it in a new image, especially since Tehran emerged from the confrontation more dependent on the military establishment, more convinced of the necessity of maintaining strategic deterrence tools, and less willing to yield to external pressures, while the United States seems to need an agreement that reduces tension and restores stability to the global economy.

The report concluded that reaching a memorandum of understanding or even a preliminary agreement does not necessarily mean resolving the crisis, because the fundamental issues related to the Iranian nuclear program, Tehran’s regional influence, and the security of navigation in the Gulf are still far from a final settlement.

Therefore, many experts believe that the region will enter a long phase of “no war and no peace,” where political and military tension continues without reaching a comprehensive confrontation or lasting peace, a situation that may give Iran additional time to consolidate its gains and rebuild its regional influence.