Who benefits from the contradictions between Bennett and Lapid? | policy

The Israeli controversy over the union of former Prime Ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid reveals that the “Replacing Netanyahu” camp faces not only a crisis of numbers, but also a crisis of meaning, as is what is required to overthrow Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in any electoral format, or to build a clearly defined political alternative?

The Israeli articles that dealt with this union gain their value from the fact that they do not read the event as a passing partisan deal, but rather as a test of the position of the former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, Gadi Eisenkot, the limits of partnership with the Arabs, the shape of the “Israeli center,” and the legacy of the Bennett-Lapid government in 2021.

Leadership complex

In Yedioth Ahronoth, Moran Azoulay reported that Yair Lapid expressed his willingness to be “third on the list” if Gadi Eisenkot joined in the second position.

Lapid’s presentation reveals the extent of the crisis within his party, Yesh Atid (There is a Future), because Lapid, who led the opposition for years, was forced to present himself as someone who would give up his position in order to win, and here the concession is not only marketed as a political virtue, but rather as an indicator of the decline of Lapid’s ability alone to lead the camp of change.

The importance of what Eisenkot said in the Azoulay report increases when he said that he did not want to engage in “political positions,” and that what concerned him was “a Zionist government. A state-run government.”

In doing so, Eisenkot is trying to establish the image of a statesman, not a man of deals, an image that gives him additional value in a scene characterized by a lack of trust in politicians.

Waiting for Eisenkot

In Maariv, Ran Adalist, an Israeli writer and political analyst known for his critical stances toward the right and settlements, wrote an article entitled “It is not in vain: Eisenkot is waiting for an opportunity that will completely change the course of the game.”

Adalist believes that Eisenkot “is right to wait,” and he linked this to his previous behavior when he preferred to wait on his military path, considering that waiting for Eisenkot turned from hesitation into a strategy of influence.

Adalist adds that Lapid’s joining does not push Eisenkot to integrate, but rather to “wait for the opportunity to gain more influence.”

The writer explains why Eisenkot does not treat the alliance as a train that must be caught, but rather as a negotiating arena that he can enter later on better terms. Hence, Eisenkot becomes one of the beneficiaries of the contradictions between Bennett and Lapid, because it turns into the piece of balance that everyone needs.

Labid collar

In Haaretz, he wrote Economic and political analyst Sami Peretz on April 29, 2026, in an article entitled “Leave Eisenkot alone,” In it, he stressed that Eisenkot’s situation is different, because he gets between 12 and 15 seats in the opinion polls, and he will not lose them unless he allys with Bennett, and therefore he does not need the alliance, rather the alliance is what he needs.

Peretz wrote that the Bennett-Lapid alliance spares Lapid from running in the elections independently, which redefines the union as a lifeline for Lapid as much as it is a project to bring down Netanyahu.

The writer also points out that the coalition – according to the first polls – does not give the two parties more seats than they would have obtained separately, and so the question becomes: Is the union expanding the camp of change or rearranging its weakness?

Right and centre

In Yedioth Ahronoth, Ben Dror Yamini, one of the newspaper’s most prominent opinion writers and an advocate of what he calls the “Zionist center,” wrote an article entitled “No More Left and Right,” in which he highlighted that the division was no longer between the left and the right, but rather between the Zionist bloc and the conscription evasion bloc.

The writer spoke about the alliance in a new ideological language, explaining that Bennett and Lapid are not only an electoral alliance, but an attempt to redefine the anti-Netanyahu camp as a state camp, military service, and recruitment.

However, the value of this proposal also lies in its limits, because Ben Dror is a right-winger defending a “Zionist bloc” that includes Bennett, Lapid, Eisenkot, and Lieberman, but it does not actually open the door to a full Arab partnership.

Here the paradox of the change camp appears, which wants to be an alternative to extremism, but does not completely break with its narrow nationalist conditions.

The absent Arabs

In Haaretz, he wrote Journalist specializing in Arab and Palestinian community affairs inside Israel Jackie Khoury An article On April 28, 2026, entitled “Bennett and Lapid continue to exclude Arabs, and they may pay the price for this in the elections.”

The writer believes that the coalition’s message to the Arab public is that the alternative does not consider them full partners, which reveals the most dangerous contradiction in the change camp, because it is asking for Arab votes to overthrow Netanyahu, but it is afraid to recognize them as legitimate partners.

Khoury wrote that relying on the Zionists is not just an electoral message, but rather a “moral dividing line.” Excluding Arabs not only threatens the Arab vote, but also reveals that the “new Israel” that Lapid talks about may remain an improved version of the same old policy.

Legacy 2021

In Israel Hayom, Professor Asher Cohen, a political science expert and one of the leaders of the “Call to Serve Science” movement, wrote an article entitled “The Loss of Ideology between Bennett 2021 and Bennett 2026,” and stressed that Bennett introduced two failures into the political system: ideological and partisan.

“When the ideology on which elections are built is neglected, the marketplace of opinions that is the foundation of democracy collapses,” Cohen said.

The writer believes that Bennett in 2021 did not create a successful precedent, but rather opened the door for small party leaders to be blackmailed in the name of saving the state, warning that Bennett in 2026 may fall into “the predicament that he dug himself” in 2021.

These articles reveal that the beneficiary of the contradictions between Bennett and Lapid is not one party, but Eisenkot benefits because he becomes the jackpot that the coalition needs in order to appear more moral, secure, and balanced. Likewise, the head of the opposition Israeli State Camp party, Benny Gantz, benefits because he can attack the union as a preoccupation with positions and not with the project.

Even Netanyahu benefits because he finds before him an opposition that is formally unified and actually divided over the Arabs, the leadership, the program, and the legacy of 2021.

The greatest danger to Bennett and Lapid is that their union will turn into a “No to Netanyahu” list only, without a clear answer to the question of the state they want to build after him.

The conclusion from Haaretz, Maariv, Yedioth, and Israel Hayom converge on one point, which is that overthrowing Netanyahu may be a common goal, but it is not enough to create an alternative if the Arabs remain outside the partnership, Eisenkot is outside the list, and the political program is postponed until after the elections.