The Mali crisis, as presented by researcher Sidi Ahmed Ould El Amir in his study issued by the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, is no longer merely an armed rebellion in the peripheries or a traditional conflict on the margins far from the state. Rather, it has turned into an existential test that affects the structure of power itself. The coordinated attacks that the country witnessed in late April 2026 were not a passing military event, as much as they were an announcement of the transition of the war from the peripheries to the center, and from exhausting the army to threatening the political system in its depth.
This transformation is the key to reading the whole scene, because it reveals that what was presented for years as a containable security crisis, has today become a state crisis, in which the military, political, social and economic levels overlap, and raises a direct question: Is the authority in Bamako still able to hold the strings of the country?
Read also
list of 2 itemsend of list
Changing the rules of war
Sidi Ahmed Ould El Amir shows that what is happening in Mali is not only an escalation in the level of violence, but a change in the nature of the war itself. The “Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin” has moved from the logic of sporadic attacks to a strategy based on suffocation, where the goal is no longer only to inflict losses on the army, but also to disrupt the state’s ability to function.
In this context, roads are no longer just transportation paths, but have turned into battlefields, fuel is no longer an economic commodity, but rather a tool of pressure, and markets are no longer neutral civilian spaces, but rather an extension of war. This shift puts the capital itself under indirect pressure, because targeting supplies means hitting daily life, thus transferring the crisis from the peripheries to the entire society.
It is a war fought not only with weapons, but with slow suffocation, where a road is closed, a convoy is targeted, prices rise, and a city is in confusion. Here the state faces an opponent who seeks not only to defeat it militarily, but also to exhaust it politically and socially.
Collapse of the old equation
Since coming to power in 2020, the military council has built its legitimacy on a clear trilogy: sovereignty, independence from Western influence, and restoring security. However, the facts presented by the researcher reveal that this equation has entered a stage of deep erosion. The withdrawal of French forces, the departure of the United Nations mission, and the shift towards a partnership with Russia did not lead to security stability, but rather coincided with the expansion of the threat and its movement to areas that were not previously targeted.
What is more dangerous is that the recent attacks did not only target traditional military sites, but also targeted symbols of authority themselves, including Kati, the regime’s military stronghold, and reached the level of assassinating the Minister of Defense. This moment carries a significance that goes beyond the event itself, because it indicates that the solid circle of the regime is no longer fortified, and that the war is no longer taking place outside the authority, but rather within its direct scope.
Here the official discourse loses part of its ability to persuade. When slogans of control are raised while the attacks reach the heart of the capital, the contradiction between words and deeds becomes more apparent, and turns into an internal pressure factor, not only within society, but within the military institution itself.
Alliances of necessity
One of the most notable things that draws attention in the study’s analysis is the operational rapprochement between the “Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin” and the “Front de Liberation de Azawad.” This rapprochement does not mean ideological fusion, as each party carries a different project. The first is cross-border and linked to jihadist discourse, and the second is local and linked to the political demands of the Tuareg. But what unites them at this moment is the common enemy: the military state in Bamako and its allies.
This pattern of alliances reveals the nature of the conflict in Mali, where relations are governed not by doctrine alone, but by shifting interests and a political vacuum. With the disintegration of the Algiers Agreement, and the absence of a comprehensive political framework, the North returned to the logic of flexible alliances, which can be formed quickly and disintegrate just as quickly.
In this context, the question is no longer: Who is fighting whom? Rather: Who is allying with whom, and why now? This is a question that reflects the fluidity of the scene more than its stability.
A symbol of fragile sovereignty
Kidal occupies a special position in this conflict, not only as a city, but as a historical symbol of northern rebellion and the limits of state control. Restoring it in 2023 with Russian support was presented as a strategic achievement for the military junta, and evidence of the success of its sovereign choice. However, the return of battles there, and the rebels’ announcement of control over sites there, re-posed the question about the nature of this control: Was it stable sovereignty or temporary military superiority?
This question does not relate to Kidal alone, but rather to all regions where control is reproduced without a political structure that guarantees its sustainability. A state that regains territory by force without reintegrating it politically is at risk of losing it again at the first imbalance of power.
Breakthrough moment
The most important transformation that the study monitors is the transition of armed groups from threatening the peripheries to penetrating the center. The attacks that targeted symbolic sites in Bamako, from the airport to the headquarters of power, were not just qualitative operations, but rather clear political messages: that the state is no longer able to protect itself in its heart.
This breakthrough carries a psychological dimension that is no less important than its military dimension. The capital is not just a geographical location, but a symbol of stability and control. When it strikes, people’s perception of the nature of the conflict changes, and fears turn from distant possibilities into daily reality.
Silent battlefield
The crisis does not stop at the borders of the state and armed groups, but rather extends to society itself. As Sidi Ahmed Ould El Amir points out, the new war is not measured only by the number of attacks, but by its impact on daily life: fuel, roads, prices, schools, and security.
At this level, a third type of actor emerges: a society that does not necessarily take sides, but judges the state by its ability to secure life. This judgment may be more influential than political discourse, because it is shaped by daily experience, not slogans.
Here lies the danger of the slow erosion of trust. States do not always collapse in one fell swoop, but may gradually disintegrate when they lose their ability to manage the small details that make up people’s lives.
A crisis that transcends borders
What happens in Mali does not stay within its borders. The study clearly highlights that neighboring countries, from Niger and Burkina Faso to Algeria and Senegal, are directly affected by what is happening, whether through trade routes or the movement of armed groups.
Under the Tri-Sahel Alliance, which includes Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, any imbalance in one country becomes a factor of pressure on other countries, especially in light of the similarity of the political and security situations there. This makes the crisis of a regional nature, whose paths cannot be separated from each other.
Russia…partner or burden?
One of the questions the study raises concerns the Russian presence in Mali. This presence was presented as an alternative to Western influence and a symbol of the restoration of sovereignty. However, the continuation and expansion of the attacks opens the door to an opposite reading: Did this presence contribute to resolving the crisis, or did it become part of its complexity?
This question is not limited to the military dimension, but extends to the political dimension, where the military council’s opponents may use it to undermine its legitimacy, by portraying it as an option that did not achieve the promised results.
Open scenarios
In light of this scene, the study proposes a set of scenarios that range from tightening security, rearranging power, and openness to compromises, all the way to a scenario of gradual erosion of the state, where the capital remains in place while actual control is distributed in the peripheries.
However, what unites these scenarios is that they all revolve around one question: How can the state be rebuilt in an environment in which it has lost control over its peripheries and is beginning to lose control over its center?
Conclusion
What Sidi Ahmed Ould El Amir’s study presents is more than a description of a security crisis; It is reading at a moment of transformation, when Mali no longer faces an insurgency, but a test of survival. The war that began on the peripheries has reached the heart of power, and the legitimacy that was built on the promise of security is facing its most difficult test.
Between armed groups that have proven their ability to adapt, an authority trying to maintain its cohesion, and a society that measures everything on the scale of daily life, Mali stands at a crossroads. The question that remains outstanding, as the text implicitly raises, is not only how this war will end, but which country will emerge from it, if it exits at all.
The study is complete
