Foreign Policy: The specter of America’s failure in Vietnam looms on the horizon policy

Foreign Policy magazine said that the current conflict between America and Iran does not fully resemble the Vietnam War, but it increasingly reflects the strategic dynamics that led to the United States’ failure in that war in the 1970s.

In an article on the subject, writer Michael Hirsch said that Iran is actually “imposing the rhythm” by adopting a strategy similar to that followed by the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh and his allies, who were able to defeat America through patience, endurance, and political pressure, rather than direct military superiority.

Hersh stressed that the psychological and strategic pressures facing the United States in its war against Iran today are very similar to those that confused the American leadership in the 1960s during the Vietnam War.

The basic similarity is the asymmetry between the interests of the two parties and their time horizons; Iran seems willing to endure a long war, while the United States seeks quick results, which therefore makes it more vulnerable to internal political and economic pressures.

Do not negotiate under pressure

The essence of this comparison lies in Iran’s refusal to negotiate under pressure. Hersh compares this position to the North Vietnamese strategy, noting that Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan repeatedly rejected American offers until the bombing campaigns stopped.

The writer quotes Ho Chi Minh as saying that the Vietnamese “will never accept negotiation under the threat of bombs,” considering that Tehran adopts a similar position today. Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, expressed this approach by saying that Iran will not accept negotiation in light of the threat.

Hirsch believes that this strategy is already beginning to bear fruit. By refusing to negotiate and forcing Donald Trump to extend a ceasefire that he had initially opposed, Iran was able to impose the tone of the conflict and determine its course. Trump’s announcement that the ceasefire will continue “until their proposal is presented” is interpreted as evidence that Tehran is setting the timetable.

The article reinforces this proposition with analyzes by experts, including Hai Nguyen of the Harvard Kennedy School, who explains that asymmetric wars often end in favor of the weaker party when it exploits the limited patience of the stronger party.

According to Nguyen, Iran realizes that America may have enormous military superiority, but it lacks the ability to fight a long-term war. This is consistent with Hersh’s idea that Tehran is targeting a fundamental American “weakness”: its limited tolerance for protracted conflicts.

Long attrition

Hersh also doubts claims of a decisive American military victory, as Tehran still maintains important military capabilities. American intelligence officials have acknowledged that Iran still possesses thousands of missiles and drones, in addition to a large portion of its naval force in the Strait of Hormuz. Reports also indicate that oil tankers linked to Iran are still succeeding in bypassing the US blockade, which weakens efforts to isolate them economically.

Like North Vietnam previously, the writer believes that Iran does not seek a quick military victory, but rather long-term psychological and economic exhaustion. By controlling the Strait of Hormuz and disrupting global oil flows, Tehran imposes costs beyond the battlefield.

Hirsch points out that this economic dimension may be crucial, especially with the rise in energy prices and inflation and their impact on American domestic politics ahead of the midterm elections.

Hirsch concluded that the conflict had entered a stage in which traditional measures of military victory were no longer sufficient, but rather endurance, political will, and economic influence had become the decisive factors.