Despite the signing of the memorandum of understanding for the truce agreement electronically between Iran and the United States and its entry into force and its announcement of an immediate and permanent end to military operations on all fronts and the affirmation of Lebanon’s unity and sovereignty, ambiguity and contradiction still surround the positions of US President Donald Trump and his administration regarding Lebanon.
Bloomberg quoted an American official as saying that Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was not a condition for the agreement and that it has the right to respond to any attacks from Hezbollah, while Trump says that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must be more responsible towards Lebanon, adding, “I am not satisfied with the way Israel deals with Lebanon and the party.”
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This striking criticism from Trump of Netanyahu reflects a sense of frustration with the ineffectiveness of the Israeli military campaign and its potential impact on the agreement to end the war with Iran. It also reflects the absence of an American negotiating strategy towards Iran or Lebanon, according to statements by political, military and academic analysts to Al Jazeera Net.
America…lack of strategy
Washington suffers from the absence of a negotiating strategy and coherent tactics, whether in the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear issue, or even the position on the war on Lebanon.
There is real confusion and tension and not a deliberate attempt to deceive. The United States does not have a coherent negotiating strategy, whether it is regarding the Strait of Hormuz, American sanctions, or the Iranian nuclear program, as Scott Lucas, professor of American and international politics at the Clinton Institute at University College Dublin, said in statements to Al Jazeera Net.
Lucas adds that there is a growing division within the Trump administration because of Lebanon. J.D. Vance and Trump’s envoys: Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff supported the agreement, while Marco Rubio and Pete Hegseth do not seem very enthusiastic about it. They were squeezed into this agreement, because Iran seized the political initiative, with the fourteen points.
This does not mean that they do not want an agreement with Iran, as Trump agreed to accept the Iranian condition that the Israelis stop attacks in Lebanon, but others in the administration are not happy with that, although they did not comment on Trump’s severe and unprecedented criticism of Netanyahu.
This is also indicated by Michael Hanna, director of the United States Program at the International Crisis Group. The public criticism of Netanyahu is striking and contrary to the position of most members of the Republican Party, as Trump now feels frustrated by the ineffectiveness of the Israeli military campaign and its potential impact on the agreement to end the war with Iran.
As for the difference in messages transmitted through diplomatic channels, there is another problem, which is that many diplomats have been marginalized in exchange for seeking help from friends and relatives, such as Witkoff and Kushner. When you “run your diplomacy through a real estate developer, Witkoff, and Kushner’s son-in-law,” and when you have politically appointed ambassadors who are not professional diplomats, like Mike Huckabee in Israel, for example, you have already restricted yourself in terms of the way you manage diplomacy. According to what Lucas said.
Lucas believes it is likely to reach a point of stability in Lebanon, because this is in the interest of the American administration, regardless of whether it supports or opposes the agreement with Iran. It is in its interest to reach a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, and between the governments of the two countries.
There is a question: To what extent will Washington allow Israel to confront Hezbollah? The final formula, according to Lucas, will be the establishment of what will be called a “buffer zone,” but in reality it will be an occupation of southern Lebanon, and it may later expand to a depth of 10 kilometers, and the matter will be very similar to what happened in Gaza.
Lucas believes that the Trump administration’s red line is: Do not attack Beirut, and then Israel will still have some freedom of movement in southern Lebanon.
This is the real test for him: Will he force Israel into a complete ceasefire despite its initial rhetorical challenge? In a few rare cases, Netanyahu was forced to stick to the course, and the opinions of others in his administration were and remain secondary, as Hanna confirms.
The United States has great influence that can be used, including in the ongoing negotiations regarding the future of US security aid to Israel, but employing these tools is another matter, according to Hanna.
However, as Hanna says, the matter revolves around Trump and Trump alone, stressing that much regarding Lebanon will depend on Iran’s position and the extent of its insistence on linking the two fronts.
Iran…mutual commitment
Iran adopted a “step by step” policy with the United States, and any move or decision would be faced with a similar one, which led to the worsening of the situation in the region and, on the other hand, created a balance between the two sides.
Both Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Tehran, Hassan Ahmadian, and Iranian political analyst Mohammad Gharvi, Director of the New Generation Media Center, agree in statements to Al Jazeera Net that Iran can withdraw from the agreement if Netanyahu does not withdraw from Lebanon, and that is because reaching the agreement was pending and conditional on resolving the Lebanese file, and this is the reason for delaying the signing of the agreement for more than a month.
Ahmadian says that the agreement is a mutual commitment, and there is a possibility of returning from one clause for another, or returning from the entire agreement in front of returning from the entire agreement. If Israel does not withdraw completely from the territories it occupied, and then cease fire on all Lebanese territories and stop assassinations and bombings, whether in Beirut or the south, this will violate the agreement, as Gharwi and Ahmadian confirm.
They say that Iran backed down from attacking Israel after the latter attacked the suburb a few days ago following mediations that pushed the Iranians to back down in exchange for Trump’s pledges to the Iranians that he would be able to restrain Netanyahu so that he does not go too far in the Lebanese file, which is an Iranian condition prior to signing.
Ahmadian draws two scenarios for the future of the agreement and the war:
- The first: Iran stops implementing the agreement until Netanyahu obliges.
- Second: For Iran and its allies to isolate Israel and proceed with implementing the agreement with the United States.
Ahmadian believes that Iran will likely put pressure on the United States through Iranian commitments and the extent of their implementation and non-implementation to stop what is happening, but the escalation scenario is very possible, because if the battle is now over, then the war is not over, and it is most likely that it will be Israeli-Iranian on the side of the allies (with Tehran).
Stopping the war completely and starting the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory is what Iran clearly requested, as confirmed by Gharvi and Ahmadian, who say that this is what we heard from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, as well as from the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, which means that there is a schedule for withdrawal in light of a complete ceasefire.
This war is a regional war, and stopping it must be regional, as Ahmadian adds. Otherwise, there is no meaning for Israel to be part of this agreement and not abide by its outcomes. Israel’s non-compliance means that it will exit the agreement, and thus striking it would be our law.
Ahmadian points out that Iran legitimized the attack on Israel in response to its attack on the suburb, and Trump also legitimized it by asking the Iranians not to respond and exchanging that for matters in the agreement (which he did not clarify).
Ahmadian concludes that we are facing an equation that is different from the past, and it will be fixed in the future as well, according to his estimation. Either Israel commits and withdraws, or it does not commit and is faced with strikes from Iran and the resistance, and the attrition continues.
For his part, Gharwi denies Iran’s interference in Lebanese affairs. The Iranians do not want to manage the Lebanese issue and respect its sovereignty. He believes that there is still sovereignty in Lebanon, unlike the United States, which interferes in every detail of the Lebanese affairs, which Iran leaves to manage Lebanon alone.
Lebanon…the cornerstone
Despite the death of more than 3,500 people and the injury of more than 10,000 others, in addition to the displacement of more than 1.3 million people inside Lebanon, and economic losses exceeding 20 billion dollars, Lebanon still represents the cornerstone of any American-Iranian understanding, with the memorandum of understanding stipulating guaranteeing Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, while also not explicitly stipulating an Israeli withdrawal and Hezbollah adhering to red lines in any truce with Israel.
It is clear that the Lebanese file is the cornerstone of any American-Iranian understanding, declared or implicit, as there is an unwritten clause related to “preserving Lebanese sovereignty” according to a formula that guarantees that the security of northern occupied Palestine will not be threatened, in exchange for turning a blind eye to the American-Western political and environmental influence of the resistance inside Lebanon, as military and political researcher Omar Maarabouni says.
Maarbouni adds, agreeing with analyst and military expert Brigadier General Bahaa Halal, that the understandings are looking for a “status quo” that preserves safe lines of return for all parties, so there is no discussion of dismantling the elements of force, but rather of “organizing the rules of engagement.” The Lebanese file is heavily present on the negotiating table as a mutual guarantee, as Tehran is asked to control the rhythm of the fronts, in exchange for Washington making concessions on economic and political files that concern the Iranian side.
Accordingly, as Halal says, the question is no longer whether Lebanon is present in American and Iranian calculations, but rather how to redefine its role: Is it as an arena of open conflict, or a space for organizing balances that prevents sliding towards a broader confrontation and one of the “strategic calibration points” to measure the seriousness of the understandings between the major powers?
This does not necessarily mean, he adds, the existence of secret understandings or completed deals. Rather, the nature of regional interactions makes the Lebanese arena a sensitive field for testing the limits of influence and the ability to control escalation.
Halal believes that any long-term path of calm in Lebanon requires a precise equation based on 3 elements:
- Reducing the possibility of a military explosion.
- Maintaining internal political balances.
- Avoid creating a security vacuum that leads to the reproduction of conflict.
However, the most prominent transformation in the current stage, as Brigadier General Halal believes, appears to be that most of the forces are now working according to the “strategic time management” model, not the final victory. That is, postponing the resolution in exchange for improving negotiating positions and draining less costs.
As for the red lines of Iran and Hezbollah, they are represented in a set of constants with some temporary flexibility in the details. Tehran and Hezbollah are aware that “biting on the fingers” at this stage requires high tactical flexibility in policy, in exchange for absolute rigidity in the constants.
The two experts, Maarabouni and Halal, agree on the red lines or core goals, which are related to the existence of the axis and its ability to continue and protect what they consider to be essential elements of deterrence or influence, and that any violation of them means going immediately to all-out war, including:
- Any proposal that talks about disarming Hezbollah.
- Dismantling its missile arsenal, especially precision and hypersonic missiles and fiber optic drones (FPV).
- Fragmentation of its leadership structure.
As for the gray lines, so to speak, or the “editable tools,” they have greater flexibility and can be ignored temporarily, including:
- Specific security arrangements in the south of the Litani, such as strengthening the role of UNIFIL and the Lebanese army, and concealing overt armed manifestations.
- Concessions in the form of the Lebanese government, ministerial quotas, or even accepting a president who is not directly affiliated with the axis of resistance but is not hostile to it.
- Accepting a long-term ceasefire or “sustainable calm,” a tactic of “postponing the conflict,” without signing peace treaties.
Israel…red lines
The red lines have already been drawn in the story of withdrawal for the Israelis, and Israel will fight desperately to stabilize them, and there is no story of mountain peaks or anything else. Israel wants to stabilize the security zone and negotiate it with the Lebanese state for an indefinite period, according to the academic and expert in Israeli affairs, Muhammad Halsa, and the expert in Israeli affairs, Amin Khalfallah, who confirms that the withdrawal will not be within the mandate of the current Israeli government, and will continue until the next government.
The red lines are seen by the expert in Israeli affairs, Firas Yaghi, as Israel’s withdrawal to lines that can be defended, that is, more than the five points and less than the yellow line, while maintaining the concept of freedom of movement, which it will not give up except in the case of a balance of power within the concept of mutual deterrence, despite the nature of the withdrawal not being determined.
The repeated argument is the security risk due to the presence of Hezbollah forces, even though Israel has reached the outskirts of Nabatieh, that is, far beyond the borders of the Litani River, at a depth of more than 45, 46, or even 50 kilometers from the occupied Palestinian border with Lebanon, and these are very large areas under the control of the Israeli army, according to Khalaf Allah.
As for the limits of American influence on the Israeli decision in Lebanon, Yaghi believes that American influence has no limits on Israel in Lebanon and other than Lebanon, but the important question is, does the American want to use his influence on the Israeli decision or not?!
He adds that the American will have influence on the Israeli decision, especially on the issue of military operations and their borders, and will press for complete withdrawal from Lebanon, but through negotiation, whether through the Iranian path or through the direct path with the Lebanese state.
The Trump administration will not exercise its influence on the Israeli decision except in one case related to American interests. If the Lebanon arena will affect the negotiations with Iran, it will not hesitate to do so. However, if Iran does not exert pressure that reaches the point of military confrontation with Israel, there will be no pressure, but rather dialogues and an attempt at persuasion, according to Yaghi.
In the context, Halasa confirms that at all stages, even if there appears to be disagreement and clash between the American and Israeli positions, in the end there appears harmony and coordination, and the American position in the end adapts itself and coexists with the limits of Israeli chaos and Israeli whims.
He adds that neither the United States, nor its administrations, nor its successive presidents used the big stick and effective pressure tools, neither in the issue of military and economic sanctions, nor in the issue of financial supplies, nor in arms supplies, nor in the position on taking diplomatic and political measures that lift the veil and expose Israel’s back.
Halasa and Khalaf Allah believe that Israel is the one that draws borders for the United States so that Washington does not go beyond the restrictions of Dahiya and Beirut, and in the worst case, Israel may accept a scheduled and phased withdrawal, conditional on the commitment of the Lebanese state, as it did in Gaza.
Political, military, and academic analysts conclude that there is ambiguity and contradiction as a result of the Trump administration’s real confusion, which has been reflected in the region’s files, whether related to Iran or Lebanon, where a point of stability is likely to be reached despite both Israel and Hezbollah’s adherence to their red lines.
