The spy industry in Gaza.. How is the motive formed? | policy

When researcher Diaa Naeem Al-Safadi approaches the subject of intelligence in his study issued by the Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, he does not deal with the crime as a purely legal incident, but rather places it within a broader framework linking war as a stressful environment, society as an open arena for penetration, and the individual as the link that can be transformed – under certain conditions – into a tool that works from within against it.

This framework is necessary, because intelligence in its contemporary form is no longer merely the transfer of information from one party to another, but rather has become a pattern of partial integration into the enemy’s system, where wills intersect and roles overlap, and the individual actor turns into part of a larger operation than himself.

In this context, the definition of intelligence becomes more complex than the common meaning of espionage. As Al-Safadi presents it, it is a conscious and intentional communication relationship between a person and a hostile party, aiming to enable this party to achieve its goals or harm the society to which that person belongs.

The definition here does not stop at the apparent action, but rather goes beyond it to the structure on which it is based, where intent, continuity, and interference with the other party’s project. In this sense, communication is not just an “act” that occurs and ends, but rather a “role” that is practiced and reproduced within a network of relationships.

What the study reveals is that the recent war on Gaza has pushed this role to more dangerous levels. Intelligence is no longer limited to providing the occupation with general or immediate information. Rather, in some cases, it has moved to field participation, where intelligence personnel contribute to identifying targets, monitoring movements, and even directing strikes indirectly. This qualitative shift means that penetration is no longer horizontal, passing through communication channels only, but has become vertical, penetrating the structure of the action itself, and reshaping it from within.

However, the most pressing question is not what the informant does, but how he gets to this point. Here the analytical value of the study emerges, because it deconstructs motives without falling into simplification. Intelligence does not arise from a single cause, but rather from a complex interaction between economic pressures, psychological fragility, social conditions, and organized polarization mechanisms practiced consciously and accurately by the enemy party.

Motivation… How preparedness is created

The economic approach remains strongly present in explaining the phenomenon, as Al-Safadi points out that poverty and unemployment open the door to temptation, and make the offer presented by the occupation appear as an opportunity in an environment in which options are narrow.

However, being satisfied with this explanation hides more than it reveals, because in many cases money does not serve as a sufficient reason, but rather as a first gateway. There are individuals who are not driven by want alone, but rather enter into an exchange relationship with the enemy, in which they estimate what they will get in exchange for what they offer.

At this very moment, communication turns from a response to a need into something resembling a transaction. The individual here does not see himself as being guided as much as he sees himself as an actor who chooses, even if his choice is governed by pressing circumstances.

This shift from “compulsion” to “negotiation” is what gives the phenomenon a more dangerous dimension, because it means that some cases of intelligence are based on rational calculations, not on a sudden moral breakdown. Here the confrontation becomes more complex, because you are not only dealing with poverty, but also with perceptions of interest, and with a psychological readiness to justify the action within oneself.

In addition to the economic factor, psychological factors emerge as another path that may lead to the same result. Frustration, feelings of helplessness, and the desire for revenge can turn into fertile ground for the polarization process. An individual who feels marginalized or oppressed may find in the relationship with the enemy a form of compensation, or a way to regain a sense of agency.

In these cases, deception does not begin as a conscious betrayal, but is formed gradually, through an interaction between a psychological need and an external presentation that responds to it.

The matter does not stop there, as the study indicates the role of social conditions in deepening fragility. Family disintegration, weak ties, and feelings of isolation are all factors that reduce an individual’s immunity and make it easier to penetrate. But Al-Safadi clearly distinguishes between understanding and justification, stressing that these factors explain behavior without giving it legitimacy. This distinction is necessary, because it allows the phenomenon to be read in depth without falling into justifying it or minimizing its seriousness.

Another striking aspect is the issue of awareness. Weak awareness, whether cognitive, political, or religious, creates a vacuum that can be filled by misleading narratives or distorted perceptions of the relationship with the enemy. On the other hand, Al-Safadi points out that the presence of a strong religious and national motive represents one of the most important obstacles to recruitment, because this motive redefines the action within the mind of the individual, and prevents it from being transformed into a mere transaction or transaction.

Map of the groups involved

The most sensitive section of the study is the one that presents field models of the groups that worked with the occupation inside the Gaza Strip, where the researcher does not just point out the presence of intelligence agents, but rather presents an accurate picture of specific formations, with geographical scopes and clear roles, revealing that intelligence is no longer an individual behavior, but rather an organized work structure.

In the southern Gaza Strip, specifically in Rafah, a group denoted by the symbol (K.S.H) emerges, and the number of its members is estimated at about three hundred people, making it one of the largest formations examined in the study. The importance of this group is not only due to its size, but also to the nature of its work, as it established a field contact point that was used as a center to monitor movements and follow up on activity within the region. This location, by virtue of its proximity to the border, allowed it to carefully monitor the vital field, collect information related to people and daily movement, and transform it into data usable for operational use. As its activity developed, its mission was no longer limited to monitoring, but rather became part of a broader network in which intelligence and military roles intersected.

In the south of Khan Yunis, and within an area extending to the areas of Khuza’a, Abasan, and Al-Qarara, another group known as (J.A.) appears, and its members number about forty armed men. This set offers a different model in terms of size, but is no less important in terms of function. It engaged in direct field intelligence work, where it collected information from within the local environment, transmitted it, and continuously followed the movements of people within the region. This style of work allowed it to build detailed knowledge of daily movement, giving the occupation the ability to deal with field data with greater accuracy, taking advantage of the fact that the information comes from within the social fabric itself.

In the east of Gaza City, a third group emerges bearing the symbol (R.G), and operates within a scope linked to the eastern and border regions. The data presented by the study indicate the involvement of this group in collecting accurate field information related to movements and activity within these sensitive areas. Its geographical location makes the information it provides of high intelligence value, because it is directly connected to the lines of contact, and allows the occupation to read in real time what is happening in an environment that is difficult to reach by traditional means.

In the northern Gaza Strip, a fourth group appears, referred to as (A.M.), operating within areas with high population density. The peculiarity of this group lies in the nature of the environment in which it operates, as integration into a dense urban fabric allows for monitoring and concealment at the same time. This group was responsible for collecting and transmitting information related to field movements and the organizational structure of some actors within the region, in a way that serves the intelligence objectives of the occupation. The danger of this pattern does not stop at the limits of information, but rather extends to its impact on society, as it contributes to undermining trust and creating a state of doubt within an environment that is supposed to incubate cohesion.

The deeper impact… the dismantling of trust

If intelligence apparently threatens security through information or participation in operations, its deeper impact is evident in what it does to the social fabric. The constant possibility of hacking creates a state of suspicion, weakens trust between individuals, and makes relationships more fragile.

In such an environment, the damage is not limited to direct losses, but extends to the ability to cohesion, which is a basic condition for any society facing external pressure.

Here a strategic goal is achieved that goes far beyond what a military strike can achieve. When a society loses self-confidence, it becomes more susceptible to disintegration and less able to produce an organized response. This dimension is what makes intelligence, as Al-Safadi presents it, a tool of war in itself, and not just a crime committed in the context of war.

a summary

Diaa Naeem Al-Safadi’s study presents a reading that sees intelligence as a complex phenomenon, formed at the intersection of need, pressure, and choice. It is not always the product of poverty alone, nor is it merely an expression of a sudden moral deviation, but rather it may be the result of a path in which the individual graduates from vulnerability to involvement, and from justification to participation. In this path, the hostile party plays an active role in discovery, recruitment, and reconfiguration.

In this sense, intelligence cannot be confronted through the law alone, despite its necessity. Rather, confrontation requires building social immunity, enhancing awareness, and restoring the bonds that make the individual less likely to be turned into a tool. The battle here is not only fought at the level of security, but also at the level of meaning: how the individual sees himself, which group he belongs to, and what he considers a limit that cannot be crossed.